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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal rests with the Utah Supreme 
Court under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 ( 3 )( j |). 
Pursuant to the authority vested in that court/ the case was 
poured-over to this Court on December 24/ 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err when it granted the motion 
for summary judgment/ dismissing as defendants James Hogle/ 
jr. and Owen C. Hogle [hereinafter "appellees"]/ in spite of 
appellees' failure to demonstrate that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and that they were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing the trial court's 
ruling, this Court must view all facts and inferences in 
light most favorable to appellants and give no deference to 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Krantz v. Holt/ 819 
P.2d 352 (Utah 1991). See also Sanderson v. First Security 
Leasing Company/ 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18/ 19 (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This appeal arises out of the trial court's granting of 
a motion for summary judgment making Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure the determinative statute. That 
Rule is set forth verbatim in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. This is an appeal from the 
judgment and Order entered on July 7/ 1992/ granting 
appellees' motion for summary judgment. 
1 
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDING. The appellants filed their 
original complaint on July 27/ 1983. In that complaint 
appellants alleged a claim based upon breach of contract and 
negligent misrepresentation. R. 2-5 On June 8/ 1984/ 
appellants filed an amended complaint wherein they 
essentially alleged the same claims as in their original 
complaint. R. 106-110 On August 30/ 1988/ the trial court 
granted appellees' motion for partial summary judgment 
dismissing the appellants' claim based upon negligent 
misrepresentation. R. 325-326 On October 1, 1988/ the trial 
court apparently granted appellees' motion for summary 
judgment by ruling that appellees could not/ as a matter of 
law/ be held liable as principals and therefor should be 
dismissed as defendants. R. 436 Then/ a mere four days 
later/ on October 11, 1988/ the trial court ordered the case 
to proceed to trial. R. 437 After further delays/ on March 
14/ 1989/ the trial court entered an order allowing 
appellants to file an amended complaint restating the first 
two causes of action and adding a third cause of action based 
upon fraud because the "complaint states a cause of action on 
its face". R. 581-582. On December 12/ 1989/ the trial 
court once again denied appellees' motion for summary 
judgment. R. 715-716 On February 28/ 1990/ the trial court 
in a minute entry ruled that "the facts [are] not so certain 
that a Summary Judgment could be granted as a matter of law." 
R. 735-736 Finally/ the trial court/ reversing its prior 
orders/ entered an order granting appellees' motion for 
summary judgment. R. 891 
3. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT. On July 7, 1992/ the 
the trial court entered an order granting of appellees' 
latest motion for summary judgment. It is from this order 
1 
that the appellants are appealing. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. That the appellants were the owners and operators of 
an automobile dealership known as Larson Ford Sales 
[hereinafter "Larson Ford"] which declared Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in 1982. 
2. That in January 1983 appellants were approached by 
Stephen P. Bruno and Dennis Gay [hereinafter "Bruno and Gay" 
respectively] regarding the sale of Larson Ford. R. 883 
3. That Bruno and Gay were later identified as agents 
acting for and on behalf of appellees. R. 883 In fact/ 
appellees personally told appellants that Bruno and Gay would 
be working with appellants to effectuate the transfer of 
Larson Ford from appellants to appellees. R. 884 That 
during all negotiations with Bruno and Gay, appellants were 
told that Bruno and Gay were acting for and on behalf of 
appellees. R. 883 
4. That on January 15/ 1983/ Walter Larson attended a 
meeting with Bruno/ Gay, and James Hogle/ Jr. and was told 
1. The trial court entered a minute entry dated June 12/ 
1992/ indicating that appellees' latest motion for summary 
judgment had been granted. R. 891 Apparently an order was 
entered on or about July 7, 1992. However, at the time of 
the drafting of this brief such order had not been made part 
of the record. Although there is no dispute between the 
parties that such an order was entered. 
that the defendants (appellees/ Bruno and Gay) were all 
principals of the earnest money offer made for the purchase 
of Larson Ford* R. 884 
5. That in February 1983 Walter Larson personally gave 
the appellees a guided tour of the entire Larson Ford 
dealership. During this tour/ Larson answered all of the 
appellees' questions concerning the dealership and, once 
again was told by appellees that Bruno and Gay would be 
working with appellants to effectuate the details of 
appellees' takeover of Larson Ford. R. 884 
6. That on janurary 1, 1983/ Wardley Real Estate 
Company approached Walter Larson to obtain a listing 
agreement to sell Larson Ford. R. 637 On January 13/ 1983/ 
an earnest money offer was made to Wardley for the purchase 
of Larson Ford by Western Slope Development. That offer was 
subject to certain conditions. R. 637/ 652-653 
7. That on February 4, 1983/ an earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase Larson Ford was signed by Bruno/ Gay 
and assigns. R. 638 
8. That during a meeting on February 18/ 1983/ attended 
by all appellants and appellees it was agreed that all the 
contingencies under the February 4/ 1983/ offer were to be 
removed by February 25/ 1983. R. 638/ 884 
9. That in February 1983/ during a meeting at Larson 
Ford attended by Walter Larson/ Bruno, Gay7 and Owen Hogle/ 
Walter Larson was informed that the appellees/ through their 
attorneys/ were communicating with the bankruptcy court 
concerning a possible loan to Larson Ford. R. 884 At the 
time the appellees entered into the agreements to purchase 
Larson Ford from appellants/ as debtors in possession/ Larson 
Ford was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. R. 636 
10. That appellees continued to visit Larson Ford. In 
fact/ it was common knowledge at the dealership that 
appellees were purchasing Larson Ford. R. 884 
11. That on March 2/ 1983/ appellees along with their 
agents/ Bruno and Gay# signed a Finders Fee agreement wherein 
they agreed to pay Wardley Corporation $75/000.00 for the 
purchase of Larson Ford. R. 668/ 885 
12. That in March 1983 Owen Hogle/ and others/ informed 
Walter Larson that they had hired a general manager for 
Larson Ford. R. 638-639/ 885 
13. That on March 5/ 1983/ an Agreement in Escrow was 
executed by Walter Larson and HBGH/ Inc./ an intended 
corporation. That Agreement expressly incorporated the terms 
and conditions of the February 4/ 1983/ Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer. R. 639/ 670-672A, 885 
14. That on March 11/ 1983/ following the instructions 
of Owen Hogle/ Walter Larson deposited all outstanding shares 
of Larson Ford into escrow. R. 886 
15. That on March 14/ 1983/ Owen Hogle re-hired all the 
employees of Larson Ford and assumed all responsibility for 
and the operation of Larson Ford. in fact/ Owen Hogle 
conducted a "Going out for business" sale. Owen Hogle paid 
employees and assumed the role of an owner and operator of 
Larson Ford. R. 886-887 
16. That appellees represented to the United States 
Bankruptcy Court that they were purchasing Larson Ford. R. 
886-887, 880 
17. That Owen Hogle and Gay filed personal financial 
statements with the Bankruptcy Court. Furthermore/ these 
documents refer not only Owen Hogle as one of the investors 
in the purchase of Larson Ford/ but a certain anonymous 
investor who had cash reserves available of half a million 
dollars (James Hogle/ Jr. certainly has such wealth). R. 640/ 
887 
18. That after executing agreements and leading 
appellants to believe that appellees were purchasing Larson 
Ford/ appellees failed to support Larson Ford's bankruptcy 
plan/ failed to negotiate with Ford Motor Company/ failed to 
substitute collateral agreements with various banks to which 
Larson Ford owed money/ failed to supply needed capital to 
Larson Ford/ and failed to subsequently execute other 
agreements to fully carry out the terms of the March 5/ 1983/ 
agreement. R. 888-889 
19. That appellees made no effort to contact the 
creditors of Larson Ford or Ford Motor Company. R. 889 
And, prior to the approval of an alternative plan in the 
bankruptcy court/ appellees withdrew their support of Larson 
Ford's bankruptcy plan and abandoned Larson Ford. R. 890 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Some of the cases presented to this Court involve 
questionable issues of either facts or law. Some cases 
presented to this Court actually involve clear issues with 
obvious solutions. Unfortunately/ some cases presented to 
this Court should not be in this Court. This case is one 
which should not even be considered by this Court. 
The trial court in this case was unable to clearly 
resolve the issues presented to it and decisively rule. And/ 
when the trial court finally made a decision/ the decision 
was wrong. 
The appellants have alleged that the appellees breached 
a contract/ were guilty of making negligent 
misrepresentations and committed fraud. 
The appellees were in fact very clever in stealing 
appellants' business. The appellees did not personally sign 
any contracts. Instead/ they had their acknowledged agents 
sign on appellees' behalf. Then appellees successfully argued 
to the trial court that they could not breach a contract they 
did not personally sign. Of course/ this Court will not trip 
over such a specious argument. Appellees should be and are 
liable for the actions of their agents. This includes being 
subject to a lawsuit based upon the breach of such contract. 
Appellees were not so clever in the negligent 
misrepresentations and fraud they committed. First/ they 
personally told appellants that appellants were dealing with 
appellees' agents in effectuating the sale of Larson Ford. 
Second/ appellees represented to the United States Bankruptcy 
Court that they were purchasing Larson Ford from appellants. 
Third/ appellees actually took over the daily operation of 
Larson Ford. 
The appellees' misrepresentations and fraud were not the 
product of smoke and mirrors but of bold face lies. 
Shockingly, the trial court refused to recognize that 
appellants had raised issues of fact and that appellees were 
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
This Court must not be misled by appellees and their 
arguments nor must this Court be deceived by the trial 
court's error. Instead, this Court must view all facts and 
inferences in light most favorable to appellants and it must 
accord no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
In so doing, this Court will correct the trial court's error 
and remand this case to the trial court for a trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEES' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in part, that a summary judgment shall be granted 
only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." 
A. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS. 
The appellants in the form of an affidavit have raised 
weighty questions of fact surrounding the appellees' 
involvement in the purchase of Larson Ford. R. 883-890 It 
should be noted that the appellees have never filed any 
affidavits admitting to or controverting the facts set forth 
in Walter P. Larson's affidavit. In fact, it must be noted 
that appellees never filed any affidavit in support of their 
motion for summary judgment. 
In his affidavit/ and answers to interrogatories/ Walter 
P. Larson has alleged that the appellees were in fact the 
individuals who were purchasing Larson Ford. The appellees 
have never denied that fact/ since they could not truthfully 
do so. In his affidavit/ Walter P. Larson further alleged 
that appellees visited Larson Ford/ that appellees 
(specifically Owen C. Hogle) took over the daily operation of 
Larson Ford/ that appellees dismissed employees of Larson 
Ford/ that appellees hired employees for Larson Ford/ that 
appellees conducted sales at Larson Ford and that appellees 
paid the bills of Larson Ford. R. 790-791/ 886 
Further evidence that the appellees were in fact 
purchasing/ and certainly misleading appellants into 
believing that appellees were purchasing/ Larson Ford can be 
found in the various agreements executed by the parties. On 
March 2/ 1983/ appellees signed a Finder's Fee Agreement 
wherein they personally agreed to pay Wardley Corporation the 
sum of $75/000.00 for its services in the acquisition of 
Larson Ford. R. 668 
Furthermore/ appellees (although they agreed to do so) 
failed to make any effort to satisfy Ford Motor Credit/ 
failed to provide substitute collateral to creditors of 
Larson Ford and/ as a final death blow/ appellees failed to 
support their own bankruptcy plan which directly led to the 
approval of another competing plan and appellants' loss of 
all economic benefits from Larson Ford. R. 859-862/ 888-889 
Based upon these undisputed facts/ the questions which 
must be asked and answered is how the appellees can claim 
that they had no involvement in the purchase of Larson Ford? 
More importantly/ how can the trial court even consider 
granting a summary judgment in favor of appellees when 
confronted with these facts? 
In reviewing the facts, this Court must assume the 
truthfulness of appellants' allegations and supporting 
evidence and it must not give any deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Krantz v. Holt/ 819 P.2d 352/ 
353-354 (Utah 1991) 
Based upon the facts of this case / it is submitted that 
the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for 
summary judgment based upon the facts of this case. 
B. APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The appellants have set forth three causes of action in 
their (second) amended complaint. R. 487-499 
1. BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The first cause of action is based upon breach of 
contract. R. 493 
On March 5/ 1983/ an Agreement and Escrow was signed by 
HBGH/ Inc. (an intended corporation) and Walter P. Larson for 
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the sale and purchase of Larson Ford. R. 670-673 That 
Agreement and Escrow incorporated the February 4, 1983/ 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and Addendum. R. 
2. In the record the last page of the Agreement and Escrow/ 
should be numbered 673 but is not numbered at all. 
673-674 
The February 4, 1983/ Earnest Money Receipt was signed 
by Bruno and Gay as "purchaser" and by Mr. Larson as 
"seller". R. 674 The Agreement and Escrow was also executed 
by the same parties in the same capacity. R. 673 
Under the Agreement and Escrow the "purchaser" agreed 
"to infuse the necessary capital" into the business. R. 672 
The appellees failed to comply with any of the 
conditions of that agreement. 
As set forth under point II below/ the appellees are, as 
they should be, held liable for a breach of contract signed 
by their agents. 
2. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
A second cause of action in appellants' second amended 
complaint is based upon negligent misrepresentation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Christenson v. Commonwealth 
Land Title Insurance Company/ 666 P.2d 302/ 305 (Utah 1983)/ 
defined the elements of negligent misrepresentation as follows: 
"(1) one having a pecuniary interest in a 
transaction/ (2) is in a superior position to know 
material facts/ and (3) carelessly or negligently 
makes a false representation concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon/ 
and (5) the other party reasonably does so and (6) 
suffers loss in that transaction/ the representor 
can be held responsible if the other elements of 
fraud are also present." 
Let us examine the facts of this case. First/ the 
appellees certainly had a pecuniary interest in the sale and 
purchase of Larson Ford. The appellees personally, and 
through their agents, Bruno and Gay, told appellants that 
they [appellees] wanted to purchase Larson Ford. Second, the 
appellees were in a superior position to know material facts. 
The appellees knew the exact nature of their relationship 
with Bruno and Gay, they knew of their own capacity to 
purchase and also to operate Larson Ford and they knew about 
Larson Ford's bankruptcy because their attorney was 
intimately involved in that bankruptcy. Third/ appellants 
made careless and negligent false representation. Appellees 
represented that they would purchase Larson Ford/ they 
represented that Bruno and Gay were their agents/ they 
represented that they would support Larson Ford's bankruptcy 
plan, they represented that they would contact Ford Motor 
Company, and they represented that they would provide 
substitute collateral to Larson Ford's creditors to allow 
appellants to retrieve their collateral. 
The appellants, of course/ trusted and relied upon the 
representations made by appellees. The appellants 
transferred stock into escrow/ they relinquished the daily 
operation of Larson Ford to appellees and they signed 
agreements to sell their family business/ Larson Ford/ to 
appellees. Under all the circumstances of this case, 
appellants' reliance can only be characterized as reasonable. 
Finally/ and tragically/ appellants have suffered a 
great loss. The appellants have not only lost a family 
business/ started by Walter P. Larson's father, but they have 
lost over a million dollars because of the intolerable 
conduct of the appellees. R. 862-863 
Viewing all facts and inferences in light most favorable 
to appellants and according no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions/ this Court must reverse the trial court's 
granting of appellees' motion for summary judgment. 
3. FRAUD 
A third cause of action alleged a claim based upon 
fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently defined fraud as "a 
false representation of an existing material fact/ made 
knowingly or recklessly for purpose of inducing reliance 
thereon upon which the plaintiff reasonably relies to his 
detriment." Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals/ Inc./ 798 P.2d 733/ 
737 (Utah 1990). 
Examination of the facts of this case clearly 
demonstrates that appellees have committed a fraud upon 
appellants. Appellees have admitted that they met with 
appellants for the purpose of extending the time within which 
conditions contained in the Earnest Money Agreement had to be 
satisfied. R. 880-881/ 884 Appellees further admitted that 
Owen Hogle filed personal financial statements with the 
United States Bankruptcy Court indicating that he intended to 
purchase Larson Ford. R. 886-887 Appellee/ Owen Hogle, as 
the owner of Larson Ford provided a dealer bond so that 
Larson Ford could legally operate as an automobile dealer 
within the State of Utah. R. 880 Furthermore, Owen Hogle 
wrote memos outlining procedures which employees of Larson 
Ford had to follow. R. 880-881 
These admissions by the appellees, coupled with the 
undisputed facts that appellees went into appellants' 
business/ assumed all responsibility for operating the 
automobile business and operated the business until the 
eleventh hour of the bankruptcy vote and then totally 
withdrew leaving appellants to turn slowly in the wind, all 
support appellants' claim that they were the victims of a 
fraud perpetrated by appellees. 
Induced by this fraud, appellants broke off all other 
discussions concerning the sale of Larson Ford with other 
prospective buyers. After all/ if appellees were purchasing 
Larson Ford/ how could appellants continue to negotiate for 
the sale of Larson Ford with other buyers? R. 860 
Appellants' reliance was reasonable and these false 
representations of appellees led to the appellants losing 
their business/ their homes and income from their business. 
R. 862-863 
The appellees misled the appellants into believing that 
the appellees were in fact purchasing Larson Ford. In the 
end/ however/ appellees failed to support appellants' 
bankruptcy plan/ a plan appellees helped draft. As a final 
act of deception/ appellees switched their support in the 
Bankruptcy Court from appellants' plan to the only other 
plan/ filed by Stephen Wade Pontiac/ an unsecured creditor of 
Larson Ford who was owed $130.00. R. 861 
After the Wade plan was approved/ appellees were paid 
all money they had invested in Larson Ford and their 
attorneys recovered all the legal fees expended. 
As a final interesting note concerning appellants' claim 
of fraud, appellants have learned that appellees and the 
other named defendants have a history of joint real estate 
dealings. And/ appellees' current counsel had previously 
represented Bruno/ HGBH/ appellants and Larson Ford, R. 862 
Appellants have stated a claim based upon fraud and have 
presented facts to support such claim. Based thereon/ this 
Court must remand this matter to the trial court so that a 
trial on the issues may be held. 
II. 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF APPELLEES' AGENTS MUST BE IMPUTED 
TO APPELLEES, AS SUCH APPELLEES ARE LIABLE FOR THE 
ACTS OF THEIR AGENTS. 
The State Supreme Court long ago ruled that the contract 
of the agent is the contract of the principal/ and the 
principal/ though not named in the contract may sue and be 
sued thereon. Zeese v. Siegel's Estate/ 534 P.2d 85/ 88 
(Utah 1975). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has further ruled that even 
though there was no contract between the plaintiff and 
defendant/ the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the 
principal where the principal entrusted handling of its 
interest in the specific transaction to the agent. 
FMA Financial Corporation v. Hansen Dairy/ Inc./ 617 P.2d 
327/ 329-330 (Utah 1980). 
These principles are also applied to claims of fraud. 
"A person may be charged with fraud even though he 
is not a party to the transaction into which the 
complainant is induced/ by the misrepresentation/ 
to enter/ particularly where such third person 
profits from the fraud and retains the benefits 
thereof/ although he may be liable even though he 
receives no benefit from the transaction. To 
render one liable in an action of deceit/ no 
privity of contract between the plaintiff and 
defendant need be shown/ the character of the 
representee being sufficient. 
One who wilfully makes false representations which 
are to be fraudulently used by another as an 
inducement to a third person to enter into a 
contract with the person repeating them is as much 
guilty of deceit as the latter and is equally 
liable to the party deceived." 37 Am Jur 2d/ 
Fraud and Leceit/ Sec. 308 
Appellants have alleged that appellees personally told 
them that Bruno and Gay were appellees' agents. R. 883-884 
In resolving this dispute, this Court must view the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
appellants. Applying this standard of review to this case, 
the only conclusion this Court reach is that Bruno and Gay 
were agents representing appellees and that appellees must be 
bound by the acts of their agents. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted 
that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for 
summary judgment. That in applying the stated standard for 
review, this Court must reverse the trial court's order and 
remand this case to the trial court for trial. 
Dated this 31st day of December, 1992. 
Hans M. Scheffler 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of December/ 
1992# four true and correct copies of the foregoing were 
delivered to Harry Caston, attorney for appellees, at 10 East 
South Temple, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dated this 31st day of December, 1992. 
17 
ADDENDUM 
Index 
Page 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure . . 1 
January 13/ 1983/ Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Larson Ford by Western 
Slope Development 2 
February 4/ 1983/ Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase Larson Ford by Bruno and 
Gay 4 
March 2/ 1993/ Finder's Fee Agreement 6 
March 5/ 1983/ Agreement and Escrow 7 
July 7/ 1992/ Order on Motion for Summary 
Judgment 11 
18 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
.practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without subv 
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
J* (e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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ADDENDUM 
THIS IS AN ADDENDUM to that certain Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase datt-d 
January 13, 1983 wherein Western Slope Development Corp. appears as Purchaser of the 
property at 5500 South State. Street, Murray, Utah, known as Larson Ford Sales: 
Purchaser agrees to purchase all assets of Larson Ford including property lease, stock 
in the corporation, all parts, furniture, fixtures, signs, accessories, equipment and 
all other items used in the operation of Larson Ford, together, with all liabilities of 
the business. 
Seller agrees to furnish the Purchaser with a list of all Larson Ford assets. Seller 
agrees to furnish the Purchaser with a list of all Larson Fordfs personal property. 
The assets and personal property should include but not be limited to: signs, furniture, 
fixtures, apparatus, equipment, machinery, tools, leasehold improvements, cars, acces-
sories, parts and appliances and replacements thereto, if any, owned by Larson Ford and 
located on or attached to the premises or used in connection with the operation of the 
premises. 
Seller agrees to make available to Purchasers agent,.at Larson Fordfs place of business, 
all books, records and other personal documents. 
Seller agrees to execute a "Non-Competition^Agreement" agreeing not to open or operate 
a car dealership within a radius of ten (10) miles from Larson Ford for a period of 
five years, carrying with it a-penalty of $500,000.00 if Seller is found in violation 
of the Agreement. 
Purchaser agrees to keep the Sellers covered on their present health insurance at the 
Sellers expense. 
Purchaser agrees to allow the Seller to.purchase cars or trucks for Seller's personal 
use at invoice price. 
This offer is subject to and contingent upon the following: 
1. Approval of Ford Motor Corporation of franchise transfer 
2. Purchaser's inspection and approval of proprty lease, such approval to be in writing 
3. Purchaser's inspection and approval of the list of the assets and the list of personal 
property, such approval and acceptance to be in writing 
4. Purchaser accepting and approving the findings of his agent after the inspection of 
the books, records and other personal documents. Such acceptance and approval 
shall be.in writing. 
Closing shall be on or before March 15, 1983. 
WESTERN SLOPE DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
By: , 
Date "Purchaser" 
Date 
"Seller" 
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THIS IS AN ADDENDUM to that certain Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 
February A, 1983 wherein Stephen P. Bruno, Dennis W. Cay and/or assigns appear as 
Purchasers of the ousiness at 5500 South State Street, Murray, Vtaht known as Larson 
Ford Sales: 
The total purchase price to be $175,000.00 to be raid in the form of cash notes or 
real estate deemed acceptable to theSeller. 
Purchaser agrees to purchase all assets of Larson Tord, including property lease, 
stock in the corporation, all parts, fumirure, fixture*, signs, accessories, equip-
ment and all other items used in the operation of Larson Ford, together with aJl 
liabilities of the business. 
Seller agrees to furnish the Purchaser with a list of all Larson Ford Assets. Seller 
agrees to furnish the Purchaser with a list of all Larson Ford's personal property. 
The assets and personal property should include but not be limited to: signs, furni-
ture, fixtures, apparatus, equipment, machinery, tools, leasehold improvements, cars, 
accessories, parts and appliances and replacements thereto, If any, owned by Larson 
Ford and located on or attached to the premises or used in connection with the operation 
of the premises. 
Seller agrees to make available to Purchaser's agent, at Larson Ford's place of business, 
all books, recotds and other personal documents. 
Purchaser agrees to sign over to Seller all right, title, liability and all interest 
in the fire insurance claim currently in dispute 
Purchaser agrees to negotiate substitute collateral to accomplish release of Larson's, 
personal liability to Citizens Bank, Zions First National Bank, Conmercial Security 
Bank, Small Business Administration, and State Tax Commission.< x * t & r ^ * * ^ 0 ^ (*%£ 
Purchaser understands that there is an immediate cash flow problem at the business, 
and upon removal of ail other contingencies, will be willing to influx needed capital 
into the business to keep it functioning during the escrow period. 
Seller represents that the total monies due to all creditors exclusive of any interest on 
sales tax or SBA, is no more than $2,100,000.00. In the event that tiie total monies 
due to all creditors is more than $2,100,000.00, the amount over $2,100,000.00 shall 
be deducted from the purchase price and downpayment respectively. 
Seller agrees to execute a "Non-Competition Agreement" agreeing not to have an owner-
ship interest in a Ford dealership witiiin a radius of five (5) miles from Larson Ford 
for a period of five years, carrying with it a penalty"of $500,000.00 if Seller is 
found in violation of the Agreement. 
Purchaser agrees to honor an agreement with Salt Lake School District for "loaner" 
cars. 
Purchaser agrees to furnish the Sellers with two (2) demos through August, 1983, 
at no cost. 
This offer subject to approval of Purchaser's and Seller's attorneys of final Buy-Sell 
Agreement, and approve! of the Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
Purchaser agrees to allow the Seller to purchase cars or trucks for Seller's personal 
use at invoice price. 
This offer subject to and contingent upon the following: 
1. Approval of Ford Motor Corporation of franchise transfer or acceptable solution 
to the franchise 
2. Purchaser's inspection and approval of property lease, such approval to he in writing 
3. Purchaser's inspection and approval of the list of the assets and the list of 
personal property, such approval and acceptance to be in writing 
A. Purchaser accepting and approving the findings of hi6 agent after the inspection 
of the books, records and other personal documents. Such approval and a<raj££ax\cj*~-r 
shall be in writing. i£i&'0,/^i hlzL 
All contingencies shall be removed in writing by noon, Tuesday, February^fc^ 
Buyer agrees to pay to Wardley Corporation a finder's fee of $75,000.00 to be pare 
at closing. Closing shall be on or before March 15, 1983. 
Date: 
Date: */<//& / / T f r / f c p -
Sellers 
FINDER'S FEE AGREEMENT 
IN CONSIDERATION of the service performed by Wardley Corporation 
'.n effecting the acquisition of all of the shares of common stock of Larson 
Ford Sales, Inc., together with all of the remaining issued and outstanding 
shares of Larson Ford SaJes, Inc., we hereby agree to pay a finder's fee in 
the amount of $75,000.00. 
SAID $75,000.00 shall be paid as follows: 
The sum of $37,500.00 shall be due and payable at the time of 
transfer of stock from Larson Ford Sales, Inc. /Walter Park Larson to the 
undersigned. At that time we hereby agree to sign a Promissory Note in the 
amount of $37,500.00. Said note shall bear interest at the rate of 12Z per 
annum, based on the diiainishing principal balance. Said note shall be payable 
in twelve equal monthly installments of approximately $3,331.88, due on the 
first day of each month beginning thirty (30) days from the date of the note. 
All monthly installments shall be applied first to interest and second to 
the reduction of principal. 
THE SAxD N01*£ shall be secured by an assignment of stock of equiva-
lent value. Any installment not received within five (5) days of the due 
date shall create a default under said note and entitle the holder to seek 
recourse under the security. At holderfs option, any such late payment 
may be accepted with the payment of a late penalty of 10Z of such payment. 
IF THE NOTE IS collected by an attorney after default in the 
payment of principal and interest, the undersigned, jointly and severally, 
agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable 
attorneyfs fee. 
DATED THIS J£ day of March, 1983. 
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AGREEMENT AND ESCROW 
AN AGREEMENT dated this S day of March, 1983, by and 
between HBGH, INC. (an intended corporation) hereinafter referred 
to as "Purchasers'1 and WALTER PARK LARSON, hereinafter referred 
to as "Seller". 
RECITALS 
1. Seller is the owner of all of the issued and outstanding 
cooBon shares of Larson Ford Sales, a Delaware corporation, and 
further represents that he is authorized to represent any parties 
claiming an interest in said stock for the purpose of carrying out 
the objectives of this Agreement. 
2. Larson Ford Sales has filed a petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act which is presently pending before 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. 
3. Seller is an officer and director of Larson Ford Sales 
and is.ipurhorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of Larson 
Ford Sales insofar as this Agreement affects the implementation 
of the debtor'8 plan of reorganization and the day-to-day opera-
tion of the business of Larson Ford bales. 
4. Purchasers desire to purchase all of the issued and 
outstanding shares of Larson Ford Sales and desire further to 
managa -the daily operations of Larson Ford Sales, including di-
recting the Cprmuiation of the plan of reorganization for Larson 
7 
5. The parties desire to establish an escrow account with 
Harold R. Stephens, Attorney at Law, 320 South 300 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, telephone (801) 328-0645, to act as the escrow 
agent to carry out the terms and conditions of the escrow. 
B. Fur i 
or/vsaid shares* Said 
IN CONSIDERATION OF the mutual promises contained herein, 
the parties agree as follows: 
A. Seller agrees to sell to Purchasers VfL of his shares 
of the common stock of Larson Ford Sales together with all of the 
remaining issued and outstanding shares of Larson Ford Sales. 
Seller shall deliver all of said shares, properly endorsed and 
assigned, to the escrow agent within 5 days from the execution 
of this Agreement, together with proper assignment of voting rights 
urn of $100,000.00* 
f cash, which 
shall be due and payable upon acceptance and p<$nfirmati^K of*" Larson 
Ford Sales plan 
escrow agejxf shall be concurrent Htth the delivery of ^ tt^ sub leet 
shares* 
C. Purchaserjj^are hereby granted ^n option on remaining 
252 shares of st*ckv£pr the amount Q ^ $ 7 5 , O O O . O G . &£tfl option 
payment sh/yfcl >e due and paya$>£e upon tirangf^g^f Ford franchise. 
D. Tha parties agx^e .that tite-Terpa and conditions set-
forth ia~*the7Barnesfc;'Moa«£ Receipt *Ad Qffexf to "Purchase and A d -
dendum dated February 4,:l983# by and,between the parties, 'except^ 
as .%nconfilatmnt with This Agreements b«; incorporated into this Agre 
Agreement shall be within ten days from the date of confirmation 
of the Larson Ford Sales plan of reorganization by the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
F. Purchasers shall have the right to rescind the purchase 
agreement and escrow in the event that the Larson Ford Sales plan 
of reorganization Is not approved by the Bankruptcy Court. Upon 
the occurrence of this event, the Purchasers have the right to 
rescind this Agreement. In that event the escrow agent is directed 
to return the subject cash to the Purchasers and the subject shares 
of stock to the Seller. 
G. Purchasers agree to infuse the necessary capital to 
iaplexnent this agreement, excluding any further funds from Walter 
P. Larson. 
H. Walter P. Larson and Larson Ford Sales, Inc. represent 
and agree to do all things necessary to maintain the Ford Motor 
Company franchise in continual force and effect until such time 
as it way be transferred. 
I. The parties acknowledge that this Agreement is meant to 
be fully binding upon the parties and that subsequent to the execution 
of other agreements, the parties agree to cooperate -fully in execu-
tiag^wtvatevet.^other agreements and documents are'necessary to tuliy 
carry* out Qx* ^ t t u and conditions of this .agreement*. 
ISUWTQIESS WHEREOF, th* parties nave set their; hands the 
4agi aniyaar^first-above-written. 
Escrow-Agent, 'HaroTLd-R. Stephens-; 
<L *v 
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LARSON FORD SALES, INC. 
BY; /&te£C^> <s^&^<^ 
ITS: fy^<?' 
Walter Park Larson, S e l l e r 
"Purchasers" 
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HARRY CASTON (4 009) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants James Hogle, Jr, 
and Owen C. Hogle 
Suite 12 00 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
Th)rd Jud»CJ£J D'r*nc! 
J U L - 7 1992 
SALTLAKbCGUNTv 
By-
b f c ^ " ^ S.JS*ffc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER P. LARSON, 
SYBIL LARSON and 
JOHN LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and 
Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
STEPHEN P. BRUNO, DENNIS We 
GAY, JAMES HOGLE, JR., and 
OWEN C. HOGLE, et al., 
Defendants and 
Counter-Claimants, 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No- C83-5542 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
On the 12th day of June, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. came on 
to be heard Defendants James and Owen C. Hogle's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The plaintiffs were represented by their counsel of 
record, John J. Borsos and Hans M. Scheffler. Defendants James and 
Owen C. Hogle were represented by their counsel of record, Harry 
Caston. The Court having heard the arguments of the parties, 
having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
it is hereby 
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